CITATION REPORT
for
Kemal Gözler, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study, Bursa, Ekin Press, 2008.

(01.01.2008 - 15.06.2020)
Click here to read this book.

(Pages, paragraphs or footnotes pertaining to the references are given between parenthesis.)

I. COURT DECISIONS THAT CITE GÖZLER’S BOOK

  1. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic: Ústavní soud, Česká Republika, Pl.ÚS 27/09 ze dne 10.09.2009, 318/2009 Sb. Kauza Melčák - Zkrácení volebního období Poslanecké sněmovny jednorázovým ústavním zákonem (Pl. ÚS 27/09 of 10 September 2009 - Constitutional Act on Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies) (footnote 10) [HTML] [HTML].
    To see reference to Gözler’s book, please click the following link: [PDF].
    German: Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichts Pl. ÚS 27/09 vom 10. September 2009, 318/2009 Slg. Fall Melčák – Verkürzung der Wahlperiode des Abgeordnetenhauses durch ein Ad-hoc- Verfassungsgesetz, (footnote 10) [PDF].

  2. Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice, Bar-On v. Israel Knesset, HCJ No: 4908/10, Date of Decision: 07/04/2011 (בבית המשפט העליון בשבתו כבית משפט גבוה לצדק בג"ץ - 4908/10 - 7.4.2011) (page 24, paragraph 32) [HTML: goo.gl/] [HTML: ruling.co.il)]; [HTML: archive.org] [PDF: elyon1.court.gov.il].
    English translation of this judgment (by “Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel (A Project of Cardozo Law School)”: “HCJ 4908/10 MK Ronnie Bar-On v. Israel Knesset”, Israel Law Reports [2011] (p.33, paragraph 32) [PDF].
    To see reference to Gözler’s book, please click the following links: Hebrew [PDF]; English Translation [PDF].

  3. Federal Supreme Court of Brazil: Supremo Tribunal Federal (Brasil), Medida Cautelar em Mandado de Segurança 34.448 Distrito Federal (MS 34448 MC / DF Relator: Min. Roberto Barroso) (10 de Outubro 2016) (Precautionary Measure No 34.448, dated of October 10, 2016, issued by Justice Roberto Barroso, member of the Court) (footnote 10) [PDF] . (To see reference to Gözler’s book, please click the following link: [PDF] .

  4. Constitutional Court of Slovenia: Republika Slovenija Ustavno Sodisce, Delno Odklonilno in Delno Pritrdilno Ločeno Mnenje Sodnika Ddr. Klemna Jakliča K Odločbi Št. U-I-32/15-56 Z Dne 8. 11. 2018 (Separate Opinion of Justice Klemen Jaklič to Decision No U-I-32 / 15-56 Z On November 8, 2018) (p.11, footnote 22) [PDF].

II. BOOKS, ARTICLES AND OTHER MATERIALS THAT CITE GÖZLER’S BOOK
(Total: 138)(01.01.2008 - 15.06.2020)

2009

  1. Ali Acar, “Tension in the Turkish Constitutional Democracy: Legal Theory, Constitutional Review and Democracy”, Ankara Law Review, Volume 6, No. 2, Winter 2009, p.141-172 (footnotes, 4, 5, 84, 91, 95, 96, 98) [PDF].
  2. Ergun Özbudun, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey”, European Public Law, Volume 15, Issue 4, 2009, p.533-538 (footnote 3) [HTML].
  3. Jan Kysela, “Kemal Gozler: Judicial review of constitutional amendments. A comparative study. Bursa: Ekin Press 2008”, Právník – 10/2009, p.1128-1130 [HTML] (Book Review).
  4. Malah Anna, Constitutional Protection in Cameroon: A Critique of the Amendment Mechanisms, Budapest, Central European University Legal Studies department, LL.M. Thesis, 2009 (footnotes 11, 80, 92) [PDF].
  5. Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Amendment, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 December 2009) on the basis of comments by Ms Gret Haller (Member, Switzerland), Mr Fredrik Sejersted (Substitute member, Norway), Mr Kaarlo Tuori (Member, Finland) and Mr Jan Velaers (Member, Belgium) [CDL-AD(2010)001] (page 44, para. 227, footnote 152) [PDF].

2010

  1. Constance Grewe, “Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois constitutionnelles en Bosnie-Herzégovine”, Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, n° 27 (Dossier : Contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois constitutionnelles), Janvier 2010 (footnote 1) [HTML].
  2. David Kosar, “Judicial Accountability and Democratic Transition: Visegrad Story”, VIIIth World Congress of Constitutional Law, Mexico City, Workshop 16 - Constitutional Principles and democratic Transition, 6-10 December 2010 (page 12, footnote 63) [PDF].
  3. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2010 (page 35, footnote 3; page 78, footnote 115) [HTM].
  4. Jan Filip, “K některým legislativním otázkám přijetí Listiny základních práv a svobod (20. výročí)”, Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, Ročník XVIII, číslo 4/2010, p.315-417 (p.323, footnote 57) [HTML].
  5. Jasna Omejec, “Kontrola Ustavnosti Ustavnih Normi (Ustavnih Amandmana I Ustavnih Zakona)”, Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske, Volume 1, No 1, Prosinac 2010, p.1-28 (“Control of Constitutionality of Constitutional Norms”, Croatian Academy of Legal Sciences Yearbook, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2010, p.1-28) (footnotes 7, 34, 48, 49, 54) [HTML].
  6. Jasna Omejec, “The Constitutional Development of European Post-Communist and Post-Socialist States” (Speech of the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia of Jasna Omejec at the international scientific), The Constitution: a Basis of Democratic Development of the State, Astana, on August 27-28, 2010 (footnote 22) [HTML].
  7. Jasna Omejec, “The Constitutional Development оf European Post-Communist аnd Post-Socialist States”, Kонституциoннoе правосудие, Выпóсę 3(49) 2010, p.33-54 (page 38, footnote 22) [PDF].
  8. John R. Vile, A Companion to the United States Constitution and its Amendments, Santa Barbara, Greenwood Publishing Company, Fifth Edition, 2010 (p.112) [HTML] ).
  9. Maxim Tomoszek, “Proportionality in Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments”, VIIIth World Congress of Constitutional Law, Mexico City, Workshop 9 - Proportionality as a principle, 6-10 December 2010 (page 5, footnote 28) [PDF].
  10. Patricia del Arenal Urueta, El procedimiento de reforma constitucional a la luz de los principios de la democracia deliberativa: una alternativa para su control en sede judicial, Tesis, Instituto tecnológico autónomo de México, Mexico, 2010 (p.38, 40, 46, 47, 48, 51, 69, 79, 107; footnotes 79, 83, 97, 99, 101, 104, 107, 109, 115, 133, 162, 225, 226) [PDF].

2011

  1. Aharon Barak, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments”, Israel Law Review, Volume 44, Issue 3, 2011, p.321-341 (footnotes 11-18, 42, 47, 56, 58) [PDF].
  2. Ergun Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p.170, 176) [HTML].
  3. Ergun Özbudun, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey”, European Public Law, Volume 15, Issue 4, 2009, p. 533-538 (footnote 3) [HTML].
  4. Hugo César Araújo de Gusmăo, “El Sistema Constitucional De Irlanda”, Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, Ańo 8, número 15, Enero-Junio de 2011, p.261-284 (p.269, footnotes 3, 5) [PDF] [HTML].
  5. Kieran Williams, “When a Constitutional Amendment Violates the 'Substantive Core': The Czech Constitutional Court's September 2009 Early Elections Decision”, Review of Central and East European Law, Volume 36, Issue 1, 2011, p.33-51, footnotes 58, 59, 60, 61. [HTML]
  6. Lech Garlicki and Zofia A. Garlicka, “External Review of Constitutional Amendments? International Law as a Norm of Reference”, Israel Law Review, Volume 44, 2011, p.343-367 (footnotes 8, 18) [PDF].
  7. Mark Tushnet, “The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review”, in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law (Research Handbooks in Comparative Law Series), Ceentelham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011 (p.332, footnote 9) [HTML])
  8. Ozan O. Varol, “The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 44, Issue 5, November 2011, p.1239-1297 (p.1291, footnote 317) [HTML].
  9. Richard S. Kay, “Constituent Authority”, American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 59, Number 3, Summer 2011, p.715-761 (footnotes 47, 50, 58) [HTML].
  10. Roberto Toniatti, “Le forme e la cultura costituzionale dell'equilibro istituzionale”, in Roberto Toniatti & Mattia Magrassi (eds.), Magistratura, giurisdizione ed equilibri istituzionali: dinamiche e confronti europei e comparati, Milano, CEDAM, 2011 (p.586, footnote 36) [HTML] [HTML].
  11. Seon-Taek, KIM, “Constitutional Review of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment - in the Case of Yushin-Constitution”, Public Law Journal, Volume 12, Issue 4, 2011, p.165-200 (footnotes 12, 17, 27, 33, 34) (in Korean).

2012

  1. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012 (p.31, footnotes 32, p.653) [HTML].
  2. Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutional Courts”, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.822, footnote 27 [HTML].
  3. Bojan Čaić, “Turski ustavnosudski conundrum i zabrana političkih stranaka: dileme ustavne reforme 2010 godina”, Pravnik, Volume 46, Issue 92, Prosinac 2012, p.37-57 (p.50, footnote 79) [HTML].
  4. Boris Balog, “Zrusenie rozhodnuti o amnestii ustavnym zakonom”, Právny obzor: Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (The Annulment of the Decision on Amnesty by the Constitutional Law”, Juridical Review: Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law, Volume 95, Issue 4, 2012, p.318-340 (p.332, footnotes 38, 40, p.340) [HTML] [HTML].
  5. Drinoczi Timea, “Gondolatok az Alkotmánybíróság 61/2011. (VII. 12.) AB határozatával kapcsolatban”, JURA: a Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának tudományos lapja, 2012/1. számp, page 37-46 = (“Reflections on Constitutional Court Decisions 61/2011, July 12th”, Legal Review of the Law Faculty of the University of Pécs , Volume 2012, Issue 1, 2012, p.37-46 (p.41, 46, notes 36, 38, 40, 41, 45, 46, 51) [PDF].
  6. Jasna Omejec - Ясна Омежек, “Новые европейские конституции переходного периода и преобразующая роль конституционных судов”, Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения, № 2, 2012, стр.10-26 [HTML] = Jasna Omejec, “New European Transition Constitutions and the Transformative Role of Constitutional Courts”, Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law, No 2, 2012, p.10-26 (footnote 15) [HTML].
  7. Jiri Novak, Problematika tzv. nezměnitelných a nezrušitelných ustanovení v ústavách, Právnická fakulta Masarykovy univerzity, Magisterský studijní program právo a právní věda, 2012 (footnotes 51, 170) [PDF].
  8. Juan Gabriel Gomez Albarello, “Reformas inconstitucionales a la constitución: żun caso agravado de la tensión entre la democracia y el constitucionalismo”, Análisis Político, Volume 25, Issue 75, Bogotá, Mayo-Agosto 2012, p.67-88 (p.73, footnotes 5, 8; p.82, 86) [PDF].
  9. Klaude Klein and András Sajó, “Constitution-Making: Process and Substance”, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.419-442 (p.439, footnote 84) [HTML].
  10. Mark Tushnet, “Constitution”, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.217-231 (p.222, footnotes 21, 231) [HTML].
  11. Otto Pfersmann, “Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: a normativist approach”, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, Volume 67, Issue 1, March 2012, p.81-113 (p.103, footnote 23) [HTML].
  12. Valentina Barbateanu, “The Influence of the Constitutional Jurisdictions on the Basic Laws”, LESIJ (Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series), No XIX, Volume 2/2012, p.137-148 (p.145, footnote 38) [PDF].
  13. Vicente F. Benítez, “Judges and democracy: between Ulysses and the mermaids' songs”, Revista de la Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, Volume 42, No 117, 2012, p.359-391 (p.385, 390) [PDF].
  14. Yaniv Roznai and Serkan Yolcu, “An unconstitutional constitutional amendment - The Turkish perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2012, p.175–207 (p.193, footnote 81; p.195, footnotes 91, 93; p.196, footnotes 94, 95, 96; p.197; p.198, footnote 103) [HTML].

2013

  1. Andrej Preuss, Změna podstatných náležitostí demokratického právního státu v judikatuře Ústavního soudu ČR, Praha, Univerzita Karlova, Právnická fakulta, 2013 (p.14, 15, 22, 25, 26, 34, 69, 103) [HTML].
  2. Enver Hasani, “Constitutional Protection of the Head of State: The Case of Kosovo”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, Volume 7, 2013, p.128-149 (p.144, footnotes 50, 52, 55, 56) [HTML].
  3. Carlos Bernal-Pulido & Yaniv Roznai, “Article Review/Response, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia”, I•CONnect: Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law , October 17, 2013 (footnote 3) [HTML].
  4. Grzegorz Kryszen, “Sad konstytucyjny Republiki Turcji a zmiany konstytucyjne”, in Stanislaw Bozyk (ed.), Aktualne problemy reform konstytucyjnych, Bialystok, Temida 4, 2013 (p.552, 554) [HTML].
  5. Jennifer Widner and Xenophon Contiades, “Constitution-writing processes”, in Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl Saunders (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law, Oxon, Routledge, 2013 (p.58, 69) (goo.gl/mAEkdU) [HTML].
  6. Otto Pfersmann, “Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista”, Revista Espanola de Derecho Constitucional, Volume 33, Issue 99, Sep-Dec 2013, p.17-60 (page 46, footnote 29) [PDF].
  7. Sabrina Ragone, “El Control Material de las Reformas Constitucionales en Perspectiva Comparada”, UNED. Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, núm. 31, 2013, p.385-406 (p.392, footnote 1) [PDF].
  8. Shimon Shetreet, “Legislative Reversals of Judicial Decisions”, in Guiguo Wang and ‎Fan Yang (eds.), The Rule of Law: A Comparative Perspective - Festschrift for Anton MJ Cooray, City Universitiy of Hong Kong Press, 2013 (p.262, footnotes 53, 55) [HTML].
  9. Stanislaw Bozyk, “Aktualne problemy reform konstytucyjnych”, Bialstok, Temida 2, 2013, p.552, footnote 21, p.554, 24 [HTML].
  10. Suzie Navot, “Israel: Creating a Constitution - The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court (1994–2010)”, in Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds.), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013, p.129-153 (p.151, footnote 65) [HTML] https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=tGp6BAAAQBAJ&pg).
  11. Yaniv Roznai, “Review by Yaniv Roznai: Is Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments Undemocratic?”, I•CONnect: Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law,October 17, 2013 (footnote 3) [HTML].
  12. Yaniv Roznai, “The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ), Volume 62, July 2013, p.557-597 (footnotes 40, 41, 47, 204) [HTML] [HTML].
  13. Yaniv Roznai, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments : The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea”, American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 61, Issue 3, Summer 2013, p.657-719 (p.660, footnote 10) [HTML].
  14. Zia Mody, 10 Judgements That Changed India, Penguin UK, 2013 (footnote 53, 59) [HTML].

2014

  1. Adama Cherif, L'effectivité des droits fondamentaux dans l'ordre juridique ivoirien: étude ŕ la lumičre du droit international et comparé, Thčse de Doctorat, Université de Genčve, Faculté de Droit, 2014 (footnote 1905) [HTML].
  2. Adem Kassie Abebe, “The substantive validity of constitutional amendments in South Africa”, South African Law Journal, Volume 131, Issue 3, 2014, p.656-694 (footnote 14) [HTML].
  3. Joel I. Colon-Rios, “A New Typology of Judicial Review of Legislation”, Global Constitutionalism, Volume 3, Issue 2, July 2014, p.143-169 (footnote 21) [HTML] [HTML].
  4. Lars Vinx and Gulsen Seven “The Democratic Legitimacy of Strong Constitutional Entrenchment: Cases of Turkey and India”, 2014 (p.37) [PDF].
  5. Maartje de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014 (p.443, footnote 206) [HTML].
  6. Manoj Mate, “State Constitutions and the Basic Structure Doctrine”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Volume 45, Issue 2, Winter 2014, p.441-498 (p.450, footnote 30) [HTML].
  7. Richard Albert, “The Structure of Constitutional Amendments Rules”, Wake Forest Law Review, Volume 49, 2014 (footnote 256) [HTML] [HTML].
  8. Yaniv Roznai, “Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Constitutional Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act”, ICL Journal (Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law), Volume 8, 1/2014, p.29-57 (p.33, footnotes 12, 21, p.54) [HTML]; [HTML].
  9. Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powers, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2014 (pages 17, 53, 75, 98, 99, 100, 101, 109, 110, 111, 129, 127, 129, 154, 172, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 194, 219, 220, 221, 222, 306) [PDF].

2015

  1. Ana Horvat Vuković, “'U Ime Ustava' – Materijalne Granice Promjene Ustava (In the Name of the Constitution – Substantive Limits of Constitutional Change)”, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Volume 65, Issue 3-4, Kolovoz 2015, p.481-503 (footnotes 41, 77) [HTML].
  2. Anna Sledzinska-Simon, “Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application in Poland”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2015, p.124-155 (footnote 27) [HTML].
  3. Bartosz Marciniak, “Constituent Power: Reality, Integrity and Unamendability” (November 2, 2015) (footnotes 102, 105) [HTML].
  4. Gabor Halmai, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and New Constitutions in Comparative Perspective”, Wake Forest Law Review, Volume 50, Issue 4, 2015, p.951-984 (footnotes 129, 135) [HTML].
  5. I-Con Editors' Choice of Books 2015, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 14, Issue 1 (January 2016), p.294-306 (p.298, footnote 16) [HTML].
  6. Jasna Omejec, “Veliki njemački ustav i nepromjenjiva ustavna načela u praksi Saveznog ustavnog suda”, "Zbornik" Pravo i pravda, Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2015 (footnotes 65, 86, 87) (="Great German Constitution and the Inalterable Constitutional Principles in the Case-Law of the Federal Constitutional Court") [PDF].
  7. Mequanint Dubie, Amendment of State Constitutions in Ethiopia in Comparison With Other Federations, Ethiopian Civil Service University, Institute of Federalism and Legal Studies Department of Comparative Public Law and Good Governance, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2015 (footnotes 31, 43 81) [HTML].
  8. Narin Tezcan, Legal Constraints On EU Member States as Primary Law Makers, Doctoral Thesis, Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 2015 (p.10, footnote 50, p.11, footnote 55) [HTML].
  9. Noppadon Detsomboonrut, International Law as a Constitutionalized Legal System, Ph.D. Thesis in Law University of Edinburgh, 2015 (p.218, footnote 317, 318) [PDF].
  10. Richard Albert, “Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, p.655-685 (footnote 235) [HTML].
  11. Richard Albert, “The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada: Comparative Perspectives on Canadian Constitutional Change”, Queen's Law Journal, Volume 41, Issue 1, 2015, s.143-206 (footnotes 53, 200) [HTML].
  12. Richard Albert, “The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution”, in Andras Koltay (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression, Budapest, Wolters Kluwer, 2015 (footnotes 131, 133) [HTML] [HTML] [HTML].
  13. S. Mohammed Azaad, “Revisiting the theory of ‘implied limitations’ on the amending power of the parliament in the Indian constitution”, Legal Bloc Journal, Volume 2 Issue 1 (Oct. 2015), p.21 [PDF].
  14. Seon-Taek, KIM, “Statement of Opinion on the Constitutionality of Article 53 of Yushin-Constitution and Emergency Decrees No. 1, 2, and 9”, Submitted to the Constitutional Court of Korea on September 30, 2011; Oral Arguments on October 13, 2011; Featured in Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 2, No 1, 2015, p.173-232 (footnotes 20, 25, 35, 41, 42) (in Korean).
  15. Yaniv Roznai and Silvia Suteu, “The Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable Constitutional Principle”, German Law Journal, 2015, Volume 16, No. 03, p.542-580 (footnotes 97, 110, 113) [PDF].
  16. Yaniv Roznai, “Towards a Theory of Unamendability” (February 24, 2015). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper, No. 15-12, footnotes 208, 324, 335, 339, 345, 430, 435, 436 [HTML] [PDF].
  17. Yaniv Roznai, “Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution”, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 2015 (footnote 12) [HTML] [HTML].
  18. Yaniv Roznai, “We the Limited People” (Draft for discussion at NYU Global Fellows Forum, March 10, 2015) (footnotes 27, 48, 87) [HTML].
  19. Zelalem Eshetu Degifie, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in Ethiopia: The Practice under Veil and Devoid of a Watch Dog”, Haramaya Law Review, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2015, p.59-80 (footnotes 15, 48, 51, 55, 60, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 77, 79, 88) [HTML] [HTML].

2016

  1. Aleksandra Troitskaya - Александра Троицкая, "Российский Конституционный Суд и проверка поправок к Конституции: как распахнуть приоткрытую дверь", Сравнительное Конституционное Обозрение, №2 (111) 2016, p.96-, footnotes 11, 26, 45 [PDF].
  2. Aharon Barak, “On Constitutional Implications and Constitutional Structure”, in David Dyzenhaus and ‎Malcolm Thorburn (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (p.65) [HTML].
  3. Bartosz Marciniak, “Constituent Power and Legitimate Constitutional Authority” (June 4, 2016). (footnotes 194, 197) [HTML].
  4. Elene Janelidze, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Georgia, France and Germany–The Quest for Eternity, LLM Thesis, Central European University, 2016 (footnotes 35, 74, 75) [PDF].
  5. Ketki Tara Kumaiyan, Impact of Major Constitutional Amendments on the Indian Polity, Kumaun University, 2016 (p.257, footnote 263) [HTML] [HTML].
  6. Lawrence Friedman, “The Potentially Unamendable State Constitutional Core”, Arkansas Law Review, Volume 69, Issue 2, 2016, p.317-334 (p.318, footnote 6) [HTML]) [HTML].
  7. Mohamed Abdelaal, “Entrenchment Illusion: The Curious Case of Egypt’s Constitutional Entrenchment Clause”, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2016 p.1-45 (footnote 189) [HTML].
  8. Reijer Passchier and Maarten Stremler, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in European Union Law: Considering the Existence of Substantive Constraints on Treaty Revision”, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, p.337-362 (p.338- footnotes 6, 49) [PDF] [HTML] (footnotes 5, 42).
  9. Zelalem Eshetu “The Scope and Limitation of the Amending Power in Ethiopia: Thinking beyond Literalism”, Mekelle University Law Journal, Volume 4, June 2016, p.1-33 (footnotes 10, 15, 27, 52, 67, 69, 72, 77, 78, 147) [PDF].

2017

  1. Christine Bell et al., “Constitution-Making and Political Settlements in Times of Transition”, Global Constitutionalism, Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2017 , p.1-12 (special section) (footnotes 3, 48) [HTML].
  2. Gülţen Seven and Lars Vinx, “The Hegemonic Preservation Thesis Revisited: The Example of Turkey”, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Volume 9, Number 1, 2017, p.45-82 (p.46, 80) [PDF].
  3. John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments: Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues: 1789-2015, Santa-Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 4th Edition, 2015, Volume I (p.263) [HTML].
  4. Manoj Mate, “Judicial Supremacy in Comparative Constitutional Law”, Tulane Law Review, Volume 92, Issue 2, December 2017, p.393-468 (footnote 275) [HTML] (footnotes 341, 342) [HTML].
  5. Richard Albert, ‎Xenophon Contiades and ‎Alkmene Fotiadou, The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017 (footnotes 80, 157) [HTML].
  6. Richard Albert, ‎”How a Court Becomes Supreme: Defending the Constitution from Unconstitutional Amendments”, Symposium - The 2017 Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze, Maryland Law Review, Volume 77, Issue 1, 2017, p.181-191 (footnote 37) [HTML]).
  7. Silvia Suteu, “Eternity Clauses in Post-Conflict and Post-Authoritarian Constitution-Making: Promise and Limits”, Special Issue: Constitution-Making and Political Settlements in Times of Transition, Global Constitutionalism, Volume 6, Issue 1 (March 2017), p.63-100 (footnote 3, 28) [HTML] [PDF].
  8. Szakály Zsuzsa, Az alkotmány stabilitását védő garanciák, Szeged, 2017 (footnotes 790, 792, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 869, 874) [HTML].
  9. Weill Rivka, “On the Nexus of Eternity Clauses, Proportional Representation, and Banned Political Parties”, Election Law Journal, Volume 16, Number 2, June 2017, p.237-246 (p.237, footnote 1) [HTML].
  10. Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Oxford Constitutional Theory, 2017, 368 pages (C3.P67, C4.P29-P30, C4P36, C5.P7-C5.P11, C5.P38, C5.P57, C5.P73, C8.P9) [HTML] ).
  11. Yaniv Roznai, “Towards a Theory of Constitutional Unamendability: On The Nature and Scope of the Constitutional Amendment Power”, Jus Politicum: Revue du droit politique, No 18, Juillet 2017 (p.22, footnote 104) [PDF].
  12. Yaniv Roznai, “Negotiating the Eternal: The Paradox of Entrenching Secularism in Constitutions”, (Symposium: Is Secularism a Non-Negotiable Aspect of Liberal Constitutionalism), Michigan State Law Review, Volume 2017, Issue 2, 2017, p.253-332 (footnote 3) [HTML].

2018

  1. David Landau, Rosalind Dixon and Yaniv Roznai, “From an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment to an Unconstitutional Constitution? Lessons From Honduras” (July 4, 2018), Global Constitutionalism (Forthcoming); FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper, No. 886, (footnote 1) [HTML].
  2. Enver Hasani, “The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of the Rule of Law in Kosovo”, Review of Central and East European Law, Volume 43, Issue 3, 2018, p.274–313 (footnote 57) [HTML].
  3. Evangelos Venizelos, Ευάγγελος Βενιζέλος, Δεσμεύεται η δεύτερη Βουλή από τις κατευθύνσεις της πρώτης στη διαδικασία αναθεώρησης του Συντάγματος; Λέξεις-Κλειδιά: Αναθεώρηση του Συντάγματος, (footnote 18) [HTML].
  4. Gert Jan Geertjes and Jerfi Uzman, “Conventions of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions”, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, p.89-121 [HTML]. (footnotes 8, 44, 62) [HTML].
  5. Lech Garlicki and Zofia A. Garlicka-Sowers, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments”, ICL Journal (ICL Journal Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, Volume 12, Issue 3, 2018, p. 307-317. (doi:10.1515/icl-2018-0039) [HTML].
  6. Manhartz Tamas Istvan, “Az alkotmánymódosítások felülvizsgálhatóságának kérdése az alkotmánybíróságok gyakorlatában”, Évfolyam, 2018/2 (footnotes 10, 12, 14, 17) [HTML].
  7. Mario Alberto Cajas-Sarria, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Colombia: a Political and Historical Perspective, 1955–2016”, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Volume 5, 2017 - Issue 3, p.245-275, DOI: 10.1080/20508840.2017.1407397 (footnote 1) [HTML].
  8. Maxim Tomoszek, “Role podstatných náležitostí demokratického právního státu v ústavní praxi České republiky”, Acta Universitatis Lodziensis Folia Iuridica, Volume 84, 2018, p.15-45 (footnote 15) [HTML] [HTML].
  9. Michael Hein, “Entrenchment Clauses in the History of Modern Constitutionalism”, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'Histoire du Droit / The Legal History Review, Volume 86, Issue 3-4, 2018 [HTML].
  10. Nadav Dishon, “Temporary Constitutional Amendments as a Means to Undermine the Democratic Order: Insights from the Israeli Experience”, Israel Law Review, Volume 51, Issue 3, November 2018, p. 389-425 (footnotes 139, 164) [HTML].
  11. Neliana Rodean, “People's Will before Judicial Review of (Un)Constitutional Amendments”, in Catarina Santos Botelho, Luis Heleno Terrinha and Pedro Coutinho (eds), Constitutionalism in a Plural World, Porto, Universidade Catalico Editora, 2018, p.21-46 (pages 32, 53) [PDF].
  12. Neliana Rodean, “Popular facets of constitution-making and constitution-amendment powers”, Forum di Quaderni costituzionali – Rassegna, March 13, 2018 (footnote 135) http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/rodean.pdf.
  13. Oya Yeđen, “Debating Unamendability: Deadlock in Turkey’s Constitution-Making Process” in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, p.281-311 (p.291, footnotes 52, 53) [HTML].
  14. Oya Yeđen, “Judicial ‘Empowerment’ through Constitutional Change: The Case of Chilean and Turkish Constitutional Courts”, Research and Policy on Turkey, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2018, p.40-67 (footnote 43) [HTML].
  15. Richard Albert ve Bertil Emrah Oder, “The Forms of Unamendability”, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, p.1-26 (p.14, footnote 89) [HTML].
  16. Ridwanul Hoque, “Eternal Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Constitution Once and for All?”, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, p.195-229 [HTML].
  17. Sabrina Ragone, “The Limits of Amendment Powers”, ICL Journal (ICL Journal Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, Volume 12, Issue 3, 2018, p. 345-356 (doi:10.1515/icl-2018-0044) [HTML]
  18. Szakály Zsuzsa, Az alkotmány stabilitását védő garanciák, Doktori (PhD) értekezés, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola, Szeged, 2018 (footnote 234, 832, 848-852, 913, 918) [PDF].
  19. Tarik Olcay, “The Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish Constitution”, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, 313-343 (p.329, footnote 84) [HTML].
  20. Tolga Ţirin, “Is the Turkish Constitutional Complaint System on the Verge of a Crisis?”, Verfassungsblog, 2018/1/27, https://verfassungsblog.de/is-the-turkish-constitutional-complaint-system-on-the-verge-of-a-crisis/; DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20180127-115542 (footnote 10).
  21. Valentina Rita Scotti, “Constitutional Amendments and Constitutional Core Values: the Brazilian Case in a Comparative Perspective”, Revista de Investigacoes Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 5, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 59-76 (p.62, footnote 10) [HTML].
  22. Yaniv Roznai, “Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability”, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, Springer, 2018, p.29-61 (p.47, footnote 120; p.50, footnote 146) [HTML].
  23. Aleš Novak, "The Many Precious Gifts of a “Secular Papacy”", Pravnik: Revija za Provno Teorijo in Prakso, Vol 73, Issue 1-2 (2018), p.29-52.

2019

  1. Michael Hein, “Do Constitutional Entrenchment Clauses Matter? Constitutional Review of Constitutional Amendments in Europe”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 17, 2019 (Forthcoming) (footnote 9) [HTML].
  2. Lucio Pegoraro, “Constitutionalization of Law and Constitutional Culture”, Revista de derecho politico, Issue 104, Jan-Apr 2019, p.57-13.
  3. Michael Hein, “Impeding Constitutional Amendments: Why Are Entrenchment Clauses Codified in Contemporary Constitutions?”, Acta Politica: International Journal of Political Science, Volume 54, Issue 2, p.224-196 (Published: APR 2019) [HTML].
  4. Luis Roberto Barroso and Aline Osorio, “The Latin American Constitutions between Life and Death: Possibilities and Limits of Amendement’s Power”, Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas, Ago 2019, Vol. 9, Issue 2, p.21-54.
  5. Landau, David E., Rosalind Dixon, and Yaniv Roznai. "From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras." Global Constitutionalism, 8.1 (2019): 40-70.
  6. Шустров, Дмитрий Германович. "Виды конституционного контроля за поправками к конституции в зарубежных странах." Конституционное и муниципальное право 10 (2019): 61-69.
  7. Ragone, Sabrina. "The “Basic Structure” of the Constitution as an Enforceable Yardstick in Comparative Constitutional Adjudication." Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenęutica e Teoria do Direito 11.3 (2020): 327-340.
  8. БОРИСЛАВСЬКА, ОЛЕНА МАРКІВНА. "ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА МОДЕЛЬ КОНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗМУ: ФОРМУВАННЯ, СУЧАСНИЙ СТАН, ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ РОЗВИТКУ." (2019).
  9. Pegoraro, Lucio. "Control jurisdiccional vs. control político: la erosión de una categoría dicotómica (y el progresivo alcance de este último)." Anuario iberoamericano de justicia constitucional 23 (2019): 43-86.

2020

  1. Satrio, Abdurrachman. "Restoring Indonesia's (Un) Constitutional Constitution: The Soepomo's Authoritarian Constitution." Available at SSRN 3544749 (2020).
  2. Yegen, O. (2020). Debating the Amendment-Making Rule: The Rigidity vs. Flexibility Debate in the Turkish Constitution-Making Process. In F. Petersen & Z. Yanaşmayan (Eds.), The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey: Regressing Towards Constitutional Autocracy (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy, pp. 249-281). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108596459.008
  3. Сергій Різник, ПРОБЛЕМИ ОЦІНЮВАННЯ КОНСТИТУЦІЙНОСТІ ЗАКОНІВ ПРО ВНЕСЕННЯ ЗМІН ДО КОНСТИТУЦІЇ УКРАЇНИ, УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ ЧАСОПИС КОНСТИТУЦІЙНОГО ПРАВА, ЧАСОПИС 4/2019, 1-14

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